Collected Papers: Volume II
Cambridge [MA], MIT Press, (2000). orig.boards. 26x18cm, xiii,792 pp. Minor rubbing. VG. dustwrapper.
¶ Contains 41 papers. Includes: Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments; The Core of a Cooperative Game without Side Payments; Introduction to "Some Thought on the Theory of Cooperative Games"; A Survey of Cooperative Games without Side Payments; The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games; A Method of Computing the Kernal of n-Person Games; Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures; Game- Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud; Markets with a Continuum of Traders; Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders; Disadvantageous Monopolies; A Note on Gale's Example; On the Rate of Convergence of the Core; Values of Markets wiuth a Continuum of Traders; Power & Taxes; Power & Taxes in a Multi-Commodity Economy; Core & Value for a Public Goods Economy: An Example; Power & Public Goods; Voting for Public Goods; Values of Markets with Satiation or Fixed Prices; Economic Applications of the Shapley Value; Endogenous Formation on Links Between Players and of Coalitions: An Application of the Shapley Value; An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value;Values for Games without Side Payments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts; In the Existence and Interpretation on Value Allocaiton; On the Non-Transferable Utility Value: A Comment on the Roth-Shafer Examples; Non-Symmetric Cardinal Value Allocations; Recent Developments in the Theory of the Shapley's Value; Spaces of Measurable Transformation...
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Keywords: Game Theory, Mathematical, Mathematics, Economics, Economic, Coalitional Games, Non-Transferable, Utility, Shapley Value,