The Liar; An Essay on Truth and Circularity
Oxford University Press, New York, 1989. Reprint, Softcover. Very Good Condition. 9780195059441 Bringing together powerful new tools from set theory and the philosophy of language, this book proposes a solution to one of the few unresolved paradoxes from antiquity, the Paradox of the Liar. Treating truth as a property of propositions, not sentences, the authors model two distinct conceptions of propositions: one based on the standard notion used by Bertrand Russell, among others, and the other based on J.L. Austin's work on truth. Comparing these two accounts, the authors show that while the Russellian conception of the relation between sentences, propositions, and truth is crucially flawed in limiting cases, the Austinian perspective has fruitful applications to the analysis of semantic paradox. In the course of their study of a language admitting circular reference and containing its own truth predicate, Barwise and Etchemendy also develop a wide range of model-theoretic techniques--based on a new set-theoretic tool, Peter Aczel's theory of hypersets--that open up new avenues in logical and formal semantics. -- rear panel blurb Size: 8vo - over 7¾" - 9¾" tall. 208 pages. The Spine Has Faded from Exposure to Light. Please refer to accompanying picture (s). Quantity Available: 1.
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Keywords: BZDB2 Liar paradox, Liar paradox, Dewey: 165 Philosophy; Logic; The Liar An Essay on Truth and Circularity Logic