Author: Cukierman, Alex
Title: Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence
Description: Cambridge [MA], MIT Press, (1998). 4th printing. orig.cloth. 23x15cm, xix,496 pp. Minor rubbing. VG. dustwrapper. ¶ Contents: Motives for Monetary Expansion under Perfect Information; The Employment Motive for Monetary Expansion; The Revenue Motive for Monetary Expansion; The Mercantilistic or Balance-of-Payments Motive for Monetary Expansion; Comparison of Policy Outcomes under a System of Adjustable Pegs with Outcomes under a Commonly Managed Currency System & Its Consequences for European Monetary Unification; The Financial Stability Motive, Interest Rate Smoothing, & the Theory of Optimal Seigniorage; Asymmetic Information & Changing Objectives under Discretion; Overview of Models of Monetary Policy with Private Information; The Employment Motive in the Presence of a Minimal Information Advantage about Objectives; An Extended Information Advantage about Central Bank Objectives; Alternative Notions of Credibility & Reputation; The Politically Optimal Level of Ambiguity; Velocity Shocks, Politics, Signalling, Inflation Persistence, & Accomodation: Private Information About Money Demand & Credibility; Partial Disclosure of Policy & Its Effect on Policy Outcomes; Why Does Inflation Persist? Theories of Monetary Accomodation & of Inflation Cyclixality under Discretion; Signaling & Private Information about the Ability to Commit & about Objectives with Time-Invariant Types; Political Parties & Monetary Policy; Central Bank Independence & Policy Outcomes: Theory & Evidence: Aspects of Central Bank Independence & their Impact on Policy Outcomes & the Distribution of Inflation; The Measurement of Central Bank Independence...

Keywords: Monetary Policy, Central Banks, Bank Banking, Economics, Economy Economic, Inflation, Econometric, Econometrics, Finance